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The representation and experience of English urban fire disasters, 
c.1580-1640.1 
ABSTRACT: Fire disasters were a perennial threat to urban life in early modern England, but are  
yet to receive sustained attention from historians. By analysing popular literature, charitable 
collections and relief distribution this article reveals how urban fires were interpreted and 
what effect they had on individuals and specific communities in England between 1580 and 
1640. Some aspects of the experience of fire disasters in early modern England are illuminated 
through detailed contextual readings of contemporary news reports, quantitative analyses of 
the collection and distribution of charitable funds, and attention to the fortunes of individual 
survivors of fires.  
* * * 
How did early modern towns deal with crisis? Historians have asked this question since the 
beginnings of the comparative history of the early modern English town in the 1970s, with 
their crises of choice traditionally plague, dearth and poverty.2 Early modern urban fires have 
however attracted relatively scant attention, despite their contemporary ubiquity. The only 
nationwide study is Jones, Porter and Turner’s ‘Gazetteer of English Urban Fire Disasters’.3 
They list 172 urban fires that destroyed ten or more houses in the period 1500-1750, with 
many more smaller but significant conflagrations.4 Several major fires stand out in the period, 
particularly between 1580-1640. The dry summer years of 1604-16 and 1630-37 caused 
particular problems for provincial towns, exacerbating risk produced through a cocktail of 
wooden buildings, inadequate ventilation and often crowded living conditions.5 Wymondham, 
Norfolk, was devastated in 1615, with a quarter of inhabitants losing their housing, and a third 
losing either their houses or their property.6 Other towns suffered repeatedly; Tiverton was 
twice very badly afflicted in 1598 and 1612, with contemporary estimates of losses totalling 
over £200,000.7 Stratford-upon-Avon was perhaps the unluckiest Midland town in the period, 
suffering significant fires in 1594, 1595, 1614, and 1641.8 This article then seeks to reintegrate 
these significant but under-researched events into the history of the early modern English 
town. 
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Whilst the ‘Great Fire’ of London and several other local events have attracted 
historical attention, there has been no attempt to synthesize local studies, or to reconcile fires, 
and the experience of fires, with the growing global and interdisciplinary field of historical 
disaster studies.9 Numerous natural hazards blighted early modern England – an earthquake 
rocked the southeast in 1580, in 1607 a freak wave flooded the south-west, in 1613 winds 
battered London and coastal regions – yet these events, their causes and their legacies remain 
under-examined in English histories. A study of a selection of fires is an initial foray into this 
field, being one of a distinctly manmade, but nevertheless natural destructive force. 
 Histories of environmental hazards have the potential to shed new light on aspects of 
social, cultural, and political history. Following the work of anthropologist Anthony Oliver-
Smith and sociologist Enrico Quarantelli, among others, historians have stressed that no 
‘natural’ disaster is entirely natural; they are manmade, ‘social phenomena, even if triggered 
by extreme natural events’.10 The early modern town was a site of finely balanced ‘managed 
uncertainty’ in terms of fire hazards which were ‘both physical events and social or cultural 
occurrences’.11 There is a historiographical consensus that ‘catastrophic events are to some 
extent cultural and socio-economic constructions’, they are time-bound and have shifting 
meanings.12 In the early modern period, ‘naturalness’ was complicated by providential 
interpretations of disasters: the concept of a ‘natural disaster’ is relatively new – early modern 
interpretations often saw them as unnatural interruptions of the status quo.13 However 
natural or unnatural they may be, fire disasters are an intersection of two ‘separate 
trajectories’, the hazard (however naturally induced), and ‘human populations whose social, 
economic and political organisations are largely culturally determined.’14 It is culture that ‘not 
only determines how a disaster comes about’, but is also ‘what constitutes a disaster in the 
first place.’15 Thus when analysing a ‘natural disaster’, we are prompted to look not only at 
physical and material causes and effects, but cultural productions and explanations, and must 
recognise the ways in which social organization constructs risk and vulnerability. 
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Whilst historical disaster studies have played an important role in recent 
environmental histories of the ‘socio-natural’, their utility for social histories, for the recovery 
of the experience of government and of communities under stress ought not to be lost. After 
all it is ‘society where disasters occur’.16 For E.P. Thompson, experience breaks through into 
the historian’s study at moments of crisis.17 Fire, after plague, for Keith Thomas, was ‘perhaps 
the greatest single threat to security’ in the early modern period.18 It was both an immediate 
and latent threat to individuals and communities; more than forty-eight major blazes occurred 
in the period 1580-1640 alone.19 Crises such as these have always tested ‘the effectiveness and 
thus the legitimacy of political power’, and during such shocks the priorities and efficiency of 
local and national institutions become apparent.20 Moving away from the traditional focus on 
plague, dearth and poverty, here local and central government responses to fires are analysed 
to further understand the socio-political consequences of ‘natural’ material crises. 
The period 1580-1640 falls within a contested period of early modern English urban 
history. Seminal narratives of the ‘crisis’ of the early modern town have been tempered, 
particularly by Alan Dyer’s research into small towns and market towns.21 The towns under 
study here are market towns, and not large urban centres.22 Market towns enjoyed a ‘golden 
age’ of general prosperity across the period up to 1700, whilst larger urban centres were more 
troubled.23 The period before 1640 has been characterised as a time when urban fires were 
‘not common’– that is the period before Civil War and the dramatic blazes of London, 
Northampton and Warwick with their ambitious ‘urban renaissance’ rebuilding projects.24 Fires 
have been portrayed as isolated incidents without great impact on the long-term fortune of 
towns.25 None of the three towns studied in detail in the final section – Nantwich, 
Wymondham and Stratford-upon-Avon – suffered particularly in the medium- and long-term 
because of their fires.26 However, such longer-term analyses that place emphasis on trends, 
fortunes and ‘golden ages’ can obscure the experiences of marginalised groups that did not 
move within the trend of urban stability. John Patten acknowledges that ‘the devastation of a 
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fire [is] rather obscured by this approach.’27 An approach which fades moments of crisis into 
blocks of fifty or one hundred years for the purpose of longitudinal study, notes Eric Jones  
reflects a stylised approach to the study of the past... resulting from a conviction that 
such events are outside human history and cannot be accounted for on its terms... 
[T]he past in reality was not a mill-pond occasionally ruffled by the breeze. It was 
made up of a ceaseless succession of adjustments and disturbances, big and little.28 
Heeding such warnings, this article aims to reclaim the experience of those afflicted by fire, in 
a period seen as peculiarly fireproof. Whilst longer-term narratives show the prosperity of 
market towns, a short-term focus demonstrates how this prosperity was based on inequalities 
that the study of disaster can illuminate. 
In comparing the responses to fires at Nantwich, Wymondham and Stratford-upon-
Avon, this article attempts to reconcile the micro-historical ‘event’ of fire with its local socio-
cultural context, and to synthesise these findings to gain a broader picture of disaster and 
relief. It moves between two distinct strands of urban history – that of the quantitative 
comparison of many urban centres, and the specific local study, more common in English 
historiography.29 Such an approach is necessary in an under-researched field, with comparison 
enabling general themes to be drawn out, whilst retaining a local, experiential focus. 
The first section analyses representations of fires in popular literature, and attempts 
an understanding of what fires ‘meant’ to those affected. Printed representations were 
memorialisations, as well as news items designed to inform, incite sympathy, and make profit. 
If disasters awaken communal ‘coping capacities’, part of this coping is ‘telling and retelling the 
story of what happened’, which in this period could invoke a Christian ‘metaphysics of 
disaster’.30 Yet cultural coping could only go so far. In the stories themselves, as well as in their 
deviations from ‘fact’ and genre, the complex meanings of a fire become apparent. Disaster 
narratives served several functions, at once communal coping exercises, practical warnings, 
and pleas for aid, exhibiting what Walsham has termed an ‘elasticity of discourse’.31 Analysed 
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as a corpus, and contextualised with other documents relating to the fires they describe, these 
elastic texts can be stretched beyond their immediate utility as sensational accounts of 
shocking events. They can reveal embellishment, half-truth, and deviation and the causes and 
motivations behind them. 
These disaster advertisements then lead on to a discussion of nationwide charitable 
collections. Relief campaigns reveal how towns were perceived nationally and regionally. 
Charitable giving gives an idea of the extent of geographic, economic and religious 
relationships between communities. Local government and the temporary officials it co-opted 
can also be analysed through its effectiveness at a time of crisis; the amount of relief 
requested is always many times greater than that received. Along with this great shortfall, 
local administrations spent a substantial proportion of the collected funds on relief campaigns. 
Looking at expenses incurred whilst collecting shows the degree of fiscal neighbourliness and 
charity amongst the ‘substantial members’ of devastated communities. Whilst a national 
system of letters patent (‘briefs’) was in place to authorise collections, a collection’s success 
was determined by its local ad hoc collection authority. Collections’ varying degrees of success 
over the period emphasise the ubiquity of the problem of fire, yet the local and personal 
experience of fire and disaster management. 
The final section discusses the distribution of relief funds. An analysis of the relief 
accounts for Nantwich (1583), Wymondham (1615) and Stratford (1641) demonstrates 
administrators’ priorities. The distribution of relief was discretionary; where money was spent 
reveals priorities, with some sections of the community relieved over others. Engagement in 
local relief activities and the prioritised reconstruction of prominent functional and symbolic 
public buildings also alludes to the importance of the civic community in post-fire towns. 
Stratford’s detailed accounts for 1641 facilitate an assessment of the speed of relief and the 
efficiency of local bureaucracy. This section culminates by assessing the impact of fires on 
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specific individuals, focussing on the context of the life-cycle, to provide texture to the 
foregoing more general analysis.32  
By analysing literature, charitable collections and relief distribution this article 
attempts to uncover how fires were interpreted and what effect they had on individuals and 
communities. There is not space here to provide a much-needed comprehensive, integrative 
account of urban fires across the entire period. Instead, printed fire narratives, and the civic 
records of fires in three provincial towns illuminate the experience of early modern fire 
disasters, and what mitigated or contributed to those experiences.  
‘Doleful Discourses’ and ‘ruthfull Reportes’ 
In his reply to a ballad that no longer survives, East Dereham fire survivor Arthur Gurney takes 
umbrage with ‘sundrie vntruethes’ reported about his town’s 1581 fire.33 In his opening epistle 
addressed to wealthy Dereham man Richard Atlee, Gurney revises loss estimates of £14,000 
down to £8,000 and the number of houses lost from sixty to fifty-two. He claims lost property 
was worth £8,000 due to age and wear, whereas £14,000 was a more probable sum for the 
‘reedifying or restauration of the same’. Gurney writes his ‘doleful Discourse and ruthfull 
Reporte’ to ‘intercept the course of an vntrueth’ which pervades ‘in diuersities of wandering 
reportes’ that have reached ‘her Maiestie, her Honorable counsaile, many noble, worshipful, & 
common personages’. Yet, by his own admission, he is victim of only ‘smal losses’ and is ‘a 
fellow feeler of the heauy burthen imposed vpon the townes estate’. He is also contemptuous 
of those who seek natural explanations, those ‘that are alwaies musling with beasts in the 
myre of worldly matters, & neuer vouchsafe to lend so muche as half an eye to looke vpon the 
sunshine of Saluation’.34 
Gurney’s text encapsulates the key themes running throughout popular literature on 
fire disasters. He identifies, and partakes in, the polemical use of statistics and representation 
in pamphlets. The acknowledgement of literature’s diverse influence is also instructive as it 
was produced not only to inform, but to incite charity. Furthermore, his moralising tone and 
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distaste for worldly explanations demonstrates a coping strategy, albeit one designed for those 
like himself and Atlee, who he implores to reform and bridle ‘those, whose religion & maners, 
you daily see too too far out of square & order’.35 His self-conscious use of balladry also alerts 
us to the importance of genre. The work is a pamphlet containing an epistle printed in the 
more exclusive Roman typeface, and a ballad, printed in blackletter, the ‘type for the common 
people’.36 This also alerts us to the intended audience of these often moralising incitements to 
charity. 
Ballads, broadsides, pamphlets and sermons about fires served several functions. They 
were practical items, containing news and persuasive accounts of events, written to inform 
and encourage charity among readers from commoners to the Queen. This readership gave 
them ‘social influence.’37 Their providential tone also demonstrates their religious function, as 
a ‘host of ballad-mongers and hacks’ used calamities, and fires in particular, as a ‘perennial 
homiletic theme’.38 This literature also bears the hallmarks of a specific genre, with common 
linguistic and stylistic tropes that narrativised towns’ stories as part of a public, discursive 
process of ‘coping’ with disaster.39 These multiple dimensions of popular disaster literature are 
not exclusive, and at times necessarily bleed into one another, as in Gurney’s ‘doleful 
Discourse’. As news items and creative accounts, pieces of ephemeral literature fulfilled 
several roles, and as they provide often the most complete extant accounts of fires, these are 
roles worth considering. 
Language and rhetoric can indicate a pamphlet’s function. As part of communal 
‘coping’, cheap print was a way for towns to externalise and understand experiences. Couched 
in providential language, cheap print narratives share common themes and literary devices. 
Raymond argues that pamphlets ‘combined subtlety with a tendency to be formulaic’, with 
readers taught to ‘tease out soteriological implications of providentially inscribed narratives by 
authors who saw entertainment as an opportunity for profit or for persuasion or 
proselytising.’40 There is a tension here between this London genre and local voices. Whilst 
John Morgan Do not circulate English urban fires 
8 
 
many contemporary wonder pamphlets were written in London with information obtained 
secondhand, some towns had considerable authorial and editorial oversight of their public 
presentation in print. In Nantwich the relief committee bankrolled the printing of pamphlets; 
Wymondham’s ballad included the town’s brief, of no benefit to author or printer; Arthur 
Gurney was a resident of East Dereham; and Bedford’s Thomas Wilcox wrote about the town’s 
1595 fire within two days, with his mind still ‘distempered’.41 Thomas Deloney, author of A 
proper newe sonet declaring the lamentation of Beckles in Suffolke (a rewrite of an earlier 
‘sonet’ by D. Sterrie) was a weaver, an author and a local, from nearby Norwich.42 He is these 
multiple personae at once – his status and heritage ally him firmly with the townsfolk, yet his 
role as an author of fiction and news pamphlets also places him in the London writing 
business.43 The use of a largely metropolitan genre could mask local voices in fire narratives, 
yet towns’ financial and spiritual interest urged them into partial authorship. The 
providentialism at play in much of the literature is repentant yet never damning. Common 
images of the ‘stately’ town, an inverted social order and the ‘mirror’ for other towns are 
conciliatory and recurrent. These images are the main tropes of the fire disaster genre, 
deployed as a way for towns to understand disaster and present it to others as a worthy 
charitable cause, as an instructive religious sign, and to distinctly locate the work within the 
genre. 
Narratives usually begin by emphasising the town’s beauty, ‘stateliness’ and good 
situation. Information on burned market towns may well have been accurate, but the 
recurrence of certain phrases is formulaic. Deloney, adopting the persona of Beccles in a 
broadsheet ballad claims ‘late in Suffoclke [sic] was I seen to be a stately towne’.44 Similarly, 
Dorchester is revered as ‘so famous a Towne', ‘beautified with many stately buildings, and 
faire streets’.45 Tiverton was blessed above all other Western towns with ‘wealth, statelinesse 
and beautie’.46 Bury is mourned for its ‘stately buildings’, now reduced to ‘a rude continent of 
heapes of stones and peeces, of Timber’.47 The towns are also variously described as being well 
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situated, with ‘fields full faire’, rivers ‘sweete running by’, being ‘good harbour for al 
trauellers’; such towns were ‘so faire as heart could wish.’48 
The aggrandisement of a town’s former state is used as a backdrop for the main 
action, the fire. Juxtaposed next to the town’s splendour, its demise is illustrated with images 
of inversion. Preacher William Whately employs these powerfully in his sermon after 
Banbury’s 1628 fire: 
How many dwelling places are become desolate? How many inhabitants 
destitute of habitation? How many wealthy men, made lesse wealthy, and 
poore men more poore? How many rich men are become poore, and poore 
men beggars? How are the labours of many a father, Grand-father, great 
Grand-father, suddenly conuerted into smoake and rubbish, in the space of a 
day and night?49 
Tiverton’s 1598 fire had destroyed hundreds of the houses of ‘the wealthiest men in the 
Towne’, yet had left alone ‘dwellings of poore and sillie men’, ‘a iust punishment of god ...  for 
their unmercifulnesse’ towards the poor.50 The wealthiest of Tiverton in 1612 had ‘to lodge 
themselues on the cold ground, that in the morning had choise of beds’; ‘those which in the 
morning were worth thousands, by night had neyther, gold, siluer, plate, nor house... no, 
scarce a garment left to weare, but onely those upon their backes.’51 This fire was ‘a spoyling 
flame’, ‘an undooer of... good people’ and ‘a flame of subuersion’.52 In Bury fire was a ‘furious 
invader’ which wreaked havoc with the social order: ‘he that the day before was esteemed a 
man (at the least) worth two or three thousand pounds ... was made lesse worth then 
nothing.’ These were the men who ‘were wont to comfort the distressed, and to feed their 
neighbours’, now ‘in danger to perish for want of reliefe’.53 
Works about ‘merchants, clothiers and craftsmen’ were the most popular in 
Elizabethan England, and it was these people that fire narratives’ inversion focussed on.54 
Tiverton is described as ‘not unknowne to many, and chiefly to English Marchants’, ‘Ten myles 
on this side of Exceter’, ‘the chiefe Market for Cloth’ in the West, and inhabited by ‘diuers rich 
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and wealthy Marchants’.55 Darlington in Durham was an important stop for ‘trauellers to 
Barwicke, or from thence to London’. Here ‘a merchant lost by the said fire a thousand 
pounds.’56 Tiverton’s 1612 fire was ‘to the utter undoing of many Merchants, and Trades-men, 
their wives, and children’.57 
The ruin of the stately, exemplary and prosperous town, and within it the best of 
merchants, is used to complete the presentation of the tragedy, by urging the reader to view 
the town as a mirror for their own sins. ‘Let me be your mirrour, to liue in the Lorde’, entreats 
Beccles in Sterrie’s ballad.58 East Dereham asks the reader ‘too now see your selues by mee... 
Whome God hath made a Myrour’.59 In lamenting the fire of 1598 Tiverton’s pamphlet 
reminds readers that they know not if ‘miserie hangeth ouer your owne heads, nor how soone 
the like calamitie may happen unto your selues’.60 The idea of the mirror absolved the town of 
guilt. Chosen to be a mirror for their contemporaries, they were ‘not the most sinners’, but 
‘punished for examples sake’ so others ‘may by speedie Repentance pacifie the wrath of 
God’.61 The unfortunately well practiced author of the Tiverton 1612 narrative leaves us with 
the clearest statement of shared guilt and partial absolution: 
let not other townes or villages of this Land thinke, that the Inhabitants of 
Teuerton were greater transgressors, because they haue suffered the greatest 
punishment: nor that they did surpasse all others in wickedness, because they 
axceede all others in woe, but thinke that it hath pleased God to punish them 
for the instruction of others, that in beholding their fall, they may feare to 
offend, and learne by their misery, a speedy amendment.62 
Whilst the ‘mirror’ was a positive externalising representation, it also had polemical 
and emotive effects. Such devices made pamphlets and ballads, as news, all the more 
immediate and applicable for its targeted readership.  
As news, ephemeral literature was an ‘opportunity for profit’ as well as ‘for persuasion 
or proselytising’. Statistics relating to losses, often included in titles, were an integral part of 
this ‘news’ function. Amid vivid accounts of great personal and communal suffering, numerical 
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statements of losses are included, all presented as fact. The inclusion of these statistics and 
other overt references to the material conditions of the town in some and not all of the 
popular literature can reveal the purpose of the pamphlet, and deviations between losses in 
literature and other contemporary estimates can reveal their polemical purposes.  
David Underdown has found contemporary overestimations of loss in The Lamentable 
and Fearefvll Bvrning of the Towne of Dorrchester. It claims ‘without partiallity’ that £200,000 
of damage was sustained and 300 houses were ruined.63 Based on a survey of private accounts 
and assessments, Underdown calculated damage totalling around £40,000 and that 170, 
rather than 300 houses were lost, attributing overestimation to ‘hysteria’.64 The first of 
Tiverton’s fires in 1598 was also subject to loss inflation. The True lamentable discourse of the 
burning of Teuerton in Deuon-shire claimed the town’s losses would ‘not be recouered againe, 
under Three or Foure hundred Thousand Ponndes’ and that ‘aboue the number of Foure 
Hundred houses’ and fifty people were burned.65 Officially, these totals were revised down. 
Archbishop Whitgift had news of a similar numbers of houses and people burned, yet only 
£150,000 of damage.66 Furthermore, parish registers suggest 33 people died in the fire.67  
The report of Tiverton’s larger 1612 fire is very different. Although nobody died, the 
town was devastated. The brief stated that excepting a handful of buildings ‘all the whole 
town’ was destroyed.68 The ensuing pamphlet did not ‘descend to statistics’, the loss being so 
great.69 It cites only one street where houses and contents were lost, valued at £50,000, and 
that 1,200 of 2,000 inhabitants had suffered.70 Tiverton also no longer repeated 
overestimations in an account of its earlier fire, included as an appendix. In official circles 
damage in 1612 was valued at £200,000, with 600 houses lost, figures reflected in Tiverton’s 
1615 grant of incorporation which mentions two fires costing £350,000.71 In the face of such 
tragedy, from which James I believed they were never likely to recover, Tiverton sought less to 
present an account of lost property, more to assert the humanitarian emergency that the town 
faced.72 The 1612 pamphlet is conspicuous in its omission of loss statistics. The fire of 1612 
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was clearly not quantifiable or reducible to losses for contemporaries, testimony to its great 
psychological and social impact. Its ending plea for charity is both emotive and despondent: 
in regard hereof well may you weepe day and night, and sit in solitary 
heavinesse without comforts of the world? such losses are sooner pittied then 
relieued, and it is an easie , but a good thing for men to say, The Lord which 
hath brought them low, can raise them up againe, which he for his mercies 
sake grant. Amen.73 
Touting statistics in pamphlets was an important part of their news function, yet as 
demonstrated by Tiverton’s second loss, was by no means essential. It is telling that Whately’s 
sermon Sinne no more contains details of losses in the subtitle only, added later when going to 
print and becoming a commodity. Whately focussed more on moral reform than reminding his 
parishioners of their losses at the time of its delivery.74 Town fires may well have been a boon 
for the ‘ballad-mongers and hacks who eked out an existence writing journalistic ephemera’, 
yet when losses were as devastating as at Tiverton in 1612, the social function of pamphlets 
shifted.75 Raymond notes the practice of recycling and ‘reconfiguring’ news pamphlets in new 
circumstances, to add meaning to a text.76 The re-imagining of Tiverton’s 1598 fire in 1612 
aptly demonstrates this. In the case of Tiverton’s pamphlets, salacious pulp news gave way to 
communal loss bearing as a major function of the texts. 
 Representations of towns’ losses successfully incited charity in the highest circles. 
Gurney noted the presence of a ballad at court and feared the effect it might have. Tiverton’s 
1598 pamphlet may well have reached the upper echelons of government. The devastation 
elicited a lukewarm response from the Privy Council, and it proved difficult to secure a brief in 
the wake of the 1598 poor law, which forbade collections from February that year. Devon 
officials were told to maintain a collection at churches within the Exeter diocese only, and to 
disperse affected inhabitants to neighbouring parishes, as ‘the burthen cannot but be great to 
the country’.77 This letter was sent on 12 April, nine days after the fire when the local relief 
efforts were already in place. However, by 14 May the Privy Council had reversed its decision, 
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allowing a collection, as Tiverton was extraordinary, ‘the number of those wome it concerneth 
very great, [and] their estate very pittifull’. 78 The change in attitude is attributable to incipient 
media pressure, caused by the publishing of the 1598 pamphlet and a broadside. On 14 April 
the pamphlet The true and lamentable discourse of the burninge of the towne of Tiverton in 
Devonshire was registered with the Stationers’ Company to Thomas Purfoot, ‘vppon Condicon 
that hee gett further laufull aucthoritie for the publlisheinge thereof.’79 Purfoot had been 
granted the right to print fire briefs in 1587.80 Whether this was published before the 
collection was granted or not, a ballad entitled the burninge of the Towne of Tiverton was 
licensed, without higher authority required, to Purfoot on 28 April.81 Meanwhile, the town had 
contacted the Master of Requests in an attempt to secure letters patent.82 The combination of 
the Court of Requests, Purfoot’s involvement, and the publishing of at least a ballad, had a 
cumulative effect and the Council accepted the town’s suit for the grant of letters patent. They 
revealingly referred to the fire in the language of the pamphlet as ‘the lamentable misfortune 
of... the towne of Tiverton’ rather than as previously, as a ‘pittifull accydent of fire’.83  
After the Nantwich fire, central authorities actively encouraged cheap print narratives. 
Kitching has traced the individuals crucial to Nantwich securing a brief and government 
backing. Among these were Alexander Nowell, dean of St. Paul’s, Lord Derby and Sir 
Christopher Hatton; Nantwich ‘had friends at court.’84 The town was also strategically 
important for military manoeuvring at a time of increasing tension with Spain.85 It is then not 
surprising to see the Bishop of London personally licence the pamphlet the true discription of 
the burninge of Nantwiche on 1 February 1584, eight weeks before the Privy Council issued a 
brief.86 The Nantwich fire was a cause to which the Queen gave, and was close to the hearts of 
several in high office. The authorities sought to publicise the fire and inspire sympathy with 
pamphlet literature. Following the Queen’s £1,000 donation, hundreds of these pamphlets 
were ‘sent abroad into the counties, cities and towns as also to the bishops’.87 
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Literary accounts were parts of towns’ coping strategies, helping to externalise and 
understand loss. In their parallel role as advertisements for grief, the polemical value of 
devastation was exploited to incite giving among the reading public in collection campaigns. It 
is to the success of these collections to which we now turn. 
‘Charitable intentions’ and ‘greedy expeditiones’ 
Relief campaigns began before briefs were granted. Burnt towns were assisted by 
neighbouring parishes, who addressed their most pressing needs. This assistance came in 
various forms. Tiverton lodged its dispossessed in nearby villages, some with the town’s own 
poor whose houses had avoided the fire.88 Local donations of grain and other relief in kind was 
crucial, judging by the frequent mention of need in pamphlets and state papers.89 Relief 
authorities were more interested in cash donations, so the only glimpses we get of non-
financial relief is when it accompanied money, as at Stratford in 1641, when Richard Wright 
sent cash and wheat ‘for his own particuler’.90 Such local kinship ties must have been 
important in the immediate aftermath of fire. As records only show formal, institutionalised 
relief we only get glimpses of this in accounts, and in passing in ephemeral literature.91 After 
the initial devastation, neighbouring communities offered other assistance, like building 
materials (Devon merchants donated timber for the rebuilding of Tiverton in 1599), or 
sustenance.92 However, there was only ever so much local communities could provide, and this 
necessitated a wider collection and letters patent from the monarch.  
 Granted briefs were highly formulaic, remaining very similar over the period. They 
recounted the state of the town before the fire, much like cheap narrative accounts, 
emphasising its strategic importance, utility to travellers or position as a market town.93 Losses 
were stated, certified by JPs, and some statement made as to why a national campaign was 
needed – Stratford was ‘in great hazard to be overthrowne & undone’ if the ‘course of 
travellers [was] diverted’, and Penzance, having been torched in a Spanish raid, was crucial for 
‘the preseruation of this our realme’.94 Briefs then stipulated collection procedures. In 
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Penzance ‘the inhabitants... any of them, their sufficient deputie or deputies’ bearing the brief 
were licenced to collect. 95 At Stratford, Corporation officers and later Warwickshire’s JPs, were 
licensed.96 The individually addressed and signed Nantwich briefs instructed Bishops and JPs in 
the counties to organise regional relief, and appoint ‘men of good credit and reputation’ to 
collect funds to send to Chester or London.97 Penzance and Nantwich show differing 
approaches by central government towards two important military towns. Penzance was 
treated with a more laissez faire attitude than Nantwich, its citizens allowed to collect 
individually, so long as they possessed a brief. When need was most pressing, after a Spanish 
raid, central government was willing to circumvent the ‘bureaucratic jungle’ that the Nantwich 
collection committee had to deal with.98 
In making specific prescriptions central government sought to regulate collections. 
However, a strong discretionary element remained that was liable to exploitation. Richard 
Quyney of Stratford-upon-Avon left a detailed account of his expenses for a collecting trip to 
East Anglia in 1598. As an alderman working on ‘town causes’ he kept meticulous records of 
receipts, of what money was his and what was the town’s. Charges to the town of £5 for horse 
hire and 37s 2d for ‘charges in London x days and home... Being in London 5 daies  and on my 
way home 3 days’ do however seem like abuse of a discretionary system when his trip involved 
as much personal debt settling as charitable collection.99 Stratford’s 1614 collection was so 
corrupt that justices Sir Henry Rainsford and Sir Richard Verney were driven to apply for a 
second brief to collect in different counties to secure sufficient funds.100 The ‘greedy 
expeditiones’ of 1614 were riven with arguments, ‘unperfect and indirect, every one 
prefferinge his owne p’vate benefitte befor the generall good, and charitable intention of 
thear letters patent’.101 Again the Corporation was presented with many ‘bills of charges 
exedinge theare Collectiones’.102 After its 1590 fire, Wolverhampton suffered selfish collectors 
who collected only for the ‘privat gaine of some fewe persons’.103 There were however some 
local heroes who went above and beyond for their communities. John Walley rode for 460 
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days in two years for Nantwich, ending up ill in bed for 7 weeks after wintertime riding; he only 
ever claimed subsistence expenses.104 Wymondham’s Phillip Cullyer was similarly public 
spirited. He lent £55 7s to the town to build a schoolhouse, funded 6 almshouses for the 
dispossessed poor, and at sixty-three rode between Norfolk and London seeking support for 
the town.105 Such ‘unsung heroes’ were unfortunately exceptional cases.106 
 Alongside the abuses of the varied system of collection were more legitimate expenses 
paid to further collections. Wymondham and Nantwich threw large banquets for local 
dignitaries, spending £6 11s and £7 9s on feasts for local baron Sir Henry Hobart and Lord 
Leicester respectively.107 The economic function of these feasts is unclear – potentially 
fundraising events in the manner of a ‘church ale’ – but their ritual importance is apparent. 
Ralph Bulkeley of Nantwich took down his shop and reassembled it in the churchyard so ‘my 
lord might there stay to hear the oration made to him’.108 As part of a communal coping 
strategy, these expensive occasions ought not to be overlooked. In the short term, banquets 
did not house the needy, but their impact is not easily measured. Communal celebrations, 
which also aided towns’ relief efforts by ingratiating them with influential lords, might have 
been a welcome change from sullen streets and griping poverty. These feasts may well have 
been the towns’ leaders ‘putting on a brave face’.109 As elite-directed events, they can also be 
seen to ‘reinforce the power of governing oligarchies and bolster urban pride.’110 The hope of 
Ralph Bulkeley is all that remains of local attitudes towards such extraordinary occasions. 
 Other than wining and dining regional dignitaries, towns met more mundane expenses 
from the relief fund. Stratford’s expenses in 1641 ran to £20 15s 2d, just over two per cent of 
the total raised.111 At Cley-next-the-Sea however, £9 17s 6d was charged to the fund, nearly a 
quarter of what was raised.112 Nantwich spent £400 (twelve per cent of £3,300 raised), with 
£60 to collectors and £8 written off as lost light gold.113 Such a discrepancy in the case of 
Stratford suggests money was syphoned off outside the accounts, with others like Richard 
Quyney taking it upon themselves to unilaterally reimburse their ‘charges’. Indeed, a 
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comparison of relief accounts also shows an unaccounted for £15 discrepancy between money 
collected and distributed.114 Stratford’s collection was however intensely local, mainly 
confined to Warwickshire, thus incurring less expense. As the chief market town for southwest 
Warwickshire, Stratford was able to exploit its regional economic significance to extract charity 
from neighbouring communities more fully than any of the other towns under study.  
 Despite hints at corruption, accounts show collectors’ activities were profitable with 
funds coming in from local and national sources. Where the location of donations was 
recorded, patterns of giving can be established. The atypical Nantwich collection shows no 
geographic or population-size pattern in charitable giving.115 With central government taking 
close interest in returns, borough and county officials were obliged to contribute, and 
consequently the only notable pattern is that Wales and the North donated very little, whereas 
London was most charitable.116 However, in local collections some patterns can be seen.  
 Detailed accounts for Stratford’s 1641 collection note the locations of donors. 
Donations can be divided into communal and individual gifts, as Stratford’s recorders noted 
any donations by an individual above ten shillings separately (see graph one).117 From a 
breakdown of returns from Avon Dasset recorded on the reverse of a brief, we can see that 
ten shillings was a generous amount; the average personal donation in this rural Warwickshire 
parish was about three pence.118 In contrast, the largest communal donations came from the 
town of Evesham (£38 8s 4d) and the Dean and Chapter of Worcester (£36 9s 1d). Donations 
from individuals came from a maximum of eighty miles away, from London, whereas 
communal donations were from much closer, the furthest being from Elford in south 
Staffordshire, and Gloucester just over thirty miles away.119 Communities’ obligations to give 
diminished after about a thirty mile radius, whilst individual bonds to the town, often bonds of 
family or kinship, facilitated longer distance giving. An incomplete document of a collection 
between 1614 and 1616 shows a similar geographic dispersal, where all but two of the 
traceable donations are from within a 30 mile radius.120 London-based Job Dighton, George 
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Nashe, Richard Quiney and Mr Sadler, were the only donors that came from beyond the thirty 
mile threshold. Dighton, Quiney, and Sadler came from families affected by at least one of 
Stratford’s previous fires, and Nashe had family and property interests in the town. Of ninety-
two donations coming from communities, forty-six came from towns within a ten mile radius, 
the area proposed by Everitt as the marketable region which towns could draw on.121 Other 
than London donations, receipts from individuals and communities scarcely show a difference 
in location. 
Donations from the gentry and peerage were also limited to those with estates in 
Warwickshire, with £40 coming in from the Earl of Middlesex of nearby Milcote Manor, and 
£20 from Lord Brooke of Warwick Castle.122 Middlesex’s contribution is striking. Having been 
stripped of his government office and been forced to surrender several substantial sources of 
income, he was, by the late 1630s, in a state of relative penury.123 His gift of £40 is the largest 
from an individual, which may be expected from the local lord, yet not one evading debts and 
selling estates.124 Middlesex’s donation ought to be seen in the context of what Ann Hughes 
has called ‘the interweaving and overlapping of different types of jurisdiction, authority and 
hierarchy’ around Stratford, at once a borough, manor and parish.125 Having moved to Milcote 
in 1636, Middlesex sought to establish influence in his manor; a substantial donation to the 
proudly independent Corporation in its hour of need was a shrewd political manoeuvre.126 
 Hughes has also described an extensive network of ‘godly’ preachers and ministers 
across Warwickshire in the 1630s and 1640s.127 From the locations of the overwhelmingly local 
returns from the 1641 collection, the importance of this network is clear. As briefs were read 
after Sunday service, an active and collaborative network of godly preachers was of doubtless 
importance to Stratford. Weekly lectures delivered by a rotating cast of local preachers at 
Stratford in the 1630s, and at Lord Brooke’s Warwick Castle into the 1640s, were ‘the most 
important foci for ministerial association’ in the area.128 Of the more exotic places donating to 
Stratford were Sutton Coldfield (North Warwickshire), Banbury (Oxfordshire) and Tamworth 
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(Staffordshire), whose ‘godly’ ministers Anthony Burgess, William Whately and Thomas Blake 
are known to have attended Warwick in 1640/1.129 These social and professional ‘godly’ 
networks became practically important in soliciting charitable contributions. 
 Incomplete collection records suggest Stratford attempted to collect money beyond 
the geographical reach of its economic and religious significance. There is fragmentary 
evidence of a fractious national collection. The account lists the losses of a few of the town 
and where these individuals were to seek relief. It is highly presumptuous, with Kent expected 
to yield £783, Suffolk £979 and Cambridge £650, this money to then be divided amongst the 
select list of claimants. Whether this collection was ever made is doubtful, as responsibilities 
for collection circuits in the North and Wales remained unfilled, and at one point two of the 
appointed collectors refused to collect having taken issue with accusations of corruption by 
local justices.130 Similarly, a planned nationwide collection was aborted in 1641. A deputation 
for Edward Lord to ride to Lincolnshire and Leicestershire is unsigned and marked ‘not 
executed’, drafted in November 1641, after the accounts were closed.131 Whilst fractious 
parish politics scuppered the 1616 collection, it may well have been the national political crisis 
of the 1640s that stymied later collections. 
 The main differences between the geographical distribution of donations made to 
Stratford, and those made to Nantwich or Tiverton can be attributed to the control of the 
collection process. Nantwich’s collection was centrally directed, money requested by letters 
signed by Privy Councillors and followed up by townsmen like John Walley. Tiverton’s 1598 
collection was centrally directed, out of enthusiasm for the recent poor law and vagrancy 
statutes rather than compassion.132 No returns remain from this collection, but a maximum of 
£5000 was set. Central government directed JPs to hand over any surplus poor rate funds to 
assize justices, and later authorised circuit justices to request ‘voluntary offering’ from the 
‘blessed’.133 Counties were expected to yield designated sums, with £50 requested of Cheshire, 
even more than it had given to Nantwich.134 These nationwide collections were successful in 
John Morgan Do not circulate English urban fires 
20 
 
obtaining money from cities, boroughs, Church officials and London merchants. Locally 
directed operations managed to gather more funds from local sources. This was down to the 
costs of collecting. The Nantwich and Tiverton collections required donors to send in money, 
with town lobbyists following up lucrative sources, whereas locally controlled collections 
involved townsmen riding out at personal cost, to spread briefs and request funds. Thus we 
see accounts like Stratford’s from 1594, where the costs of collecting in Derbyshire (£8 3s 9d) 
were greater than what was collected (£4 3s 8d).135 The law of diminishing returns affected 
locally directed campaigns more, in terms of distance travelled, as officials were unable to 
assess which areas were particularly receptive before they had ridden out to collect there, 
unlike centrally directed collections. 
 It may then seem that central government involvement was advantageous, yet a 
comparison of total collection returns relative to requests does not suggest so. In provincial 
towns, funds raised from across the organisational spectrum amount to between ten and 
fifteen per cent of what was lost or requested after a fire. Tiverton’s limit of £5,000 (never 
reached) was just three per cent of total claimed damage, and this system was not used 
again.136 Nantwich raised a creditable eleven per cent of funds requested, but the highest 
yields were at Dorchester in 1623 and Wymondham in 1615, raising sixteen and fourteen per 
cent of their claimed damage respectively.137 
 What these figures suggest is that central government involvement, be it through 
direct prescription or bureaucratic process tended not to aid the overall gains of a town. 
Collections were only ever authorised for a fixed number of years, often at most two, meaning 
collectors worked against the clock. Reticence or bureaucracy at Whitehall could take up 
valuable time and impede collections. At Stratford, accounts record that £125 (fourteen per 
cent of the total raised) was contributed on the day of the fire itself, most from within twelve 
miles.138 Similarly, at Dorchester in 1623 a collection was made on the Sunday after the fire, at 
St Martin’s Church, yielding £58 (ten per cent of the total).139 At Wymondham however, it took 
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six years to raise £2,171 (14 per cent of losses) in a collection supervised mainly by county 
gentry not resident in the town.140 In the immediate aftermath of fires need and generosity 
was at its greatest. Local collections could better address local needs. Stratford’s 1641 account 
was open for only seven months, whereas Nantwich’s was open for two years, but both raised 
around ten per cent of total claimed losses.141 Even accounting for the relative magnitude of 
the estimated damage (Nantwich at £30,000 and Stratford at £8,700) the comparison stands, 
Stratford raising on average £125 per month and Nantwich £138, which includes a £1000 
donation from the Queen. 
 We ought not to be complacent about the effectiveness of local campaigns. No 
collection raised anywhere near the amount of money lost in the fires, and this led to many 
individuals going without, or with insufficient, monetary relief. There is also no way of getting 
at the ‘dark figure’ of neighbourly relief, in kind and monetarily, given without recourse to 
local institutions. This must not be underestimated, especially in the case of Tiverton which 
after seemingly raising so little, continued to grow in population and increase in trade, checked 
but not halted, by two great fires and plague from 1590 to 1620.142 The distribution of this 
known relief is analysed in the following section. 
‘Equall and indifferent distribution’? 
Distributing funds was a political exercise involving social and economic decisions, with some 
individuals given priority over others. A committee at Basingstoke in 1601 was required to ‘doe 
a woorke full of charitie’ and ‘make equall and indifferent distribution... according to 
conscience and consideration’.143 Discretionary ‘charitie’ necessitated distinctions between 
loss and need, with the latter determined with reference to the individual and the community. 
Alongside this was the operation of a bureaucracy that could effectively distribute money. 
Accounts of relief distribution are at once records of social and economic priorities, and 
records of bureaucratic processes. Relief distribution was as varied as charitable donation and 
collection. Distribution was the responsibility of relatively discrete local groups, assembled like 
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select vestries from those with local power. These were administrative bodies, but also 
constituted a ‘social and political space through which authority was transmitted.’144 
Comprehensive accounts from Nantwich, Wymondham and Stratford invite comparisons of 
this politics of local support. 
 The process of relieving the distressed began with the potentially contentious 
assessment of damage, loss or need. Fires in this period occurred before any formal system of 
insurance; there were no specialised loss adjusters to produce documents like Warwick’s 1695 
‘Book of Reductions.145 Incipient loss adjusters can be identified in several towns. As 
mentioned above, early estimations of losses could be polemical and inaccurate, printed in 
pamphlets but later revised. Whilst this was an opaque and impressionistic exercise in 
literature, relief accounts show adjustments more clearly. Loss adjustment was often 
conducted at the behest of those with economic interests in keeping claims down. In Cley-
next-the-Sea, villager Thomas Greve was instructed by Nathaniel Bacon to ‘conterre and 
consider who are fitt to be relieved and in what measure.’ This Greve duly did, producing a 
‘trewe note’ of the ‘trewe valew of ther losse and... remainder’ which reduced losses by an 
average of sixty to eighty per cent and removed gentry claims altogether.146 Directed by a large 
local landowner and deputy lieutenant dubbed ‘Mr Lawier’ by his family, Greve’s task was one 
set by an absentee official, dwelling in the south of the county, more acquainted with the 
demands of the law than the needs of the inhabitants of Cley.147 Nantwich’s assessment was 
outlined by the Privy Council. Losses were to be noted in a ‘perfect booke’, along with ‘a note 
of every mans abylity to beare his severall losses.’ The emphasis was on individuals’ ability to 
contribute ‘some good proportion’ towards rebuilding.148 The Nantwich accounts then only 
give the amounts paid and received by claimants, not the total damage, need or claim.149 In 
Wymondham, where relief was controlled by outlying gentry, loss adjustment can be inferred 
from the regularity of losses recorded. The survey was conducted nine months after the fire, 
by Sir Henry Hobart and the county JPs.150 There are ten entries for losses of £13 6s 8d, exactly 
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one third of £40. Similarly, there are seven entries of £6 13s 4d, one third of £20. Seven 
specific claims ranging from £3 6s 8d to £66 13s 4d, accounted down to shillings and pence, 
that are a third of larger round figures, occur twenty-nine times in the Book of Losses, 
suggesting a systematic program of loss adjustment undertaken by Hobart and the JPs.151  
The account of Stratford’s 1641 losses differs. As an incorporated town, it was less 
subject to rule by local lords and its governance was dominated by substantial townsmen. 
There are subsequently no discernable patterns implying adjustment in listed losses. Although 
undated, the account was likely drawn up between 10 March, the fire, and 17 March, the first 
distribution. It must have been made before the 25th, as it is dated just ‘1640’, implying the old 
style dating convention.152 It is also arranged alphabetically by surname, implying it is a fair 
copy, rather than a draft. Claims range from Edward Sulter’s eight quarters of malt, to Mrs 
Wilson’s £1175 11s 2d.153 Made within two weeks of the fire, this assessment was subject to 
little loss adjustment. A local fire committee made up of six aldermen, the high bailiff, the 
town clerk, three local gentlemen, a lawyer, the schoolmaster and the vicar distributed 
money.154 With this committee operating assessment and collection in Stratford, in contrast to 
the situations in Wymondham, Cley and Nantwich where out-of-town gentry or the Privy 
Council were responsible, relief assessment was more in line with immediate perceived local 
need, focussed on the town and its inhabitants, rather than on long-term or financial concerns 
affecting donation and collection.  
 Specific local sensitivities were attended to early on, and Stratford’s meticulously 
dated accounts facilitate an analysis of these immediate priorities.155 Wymondham’s give a 
relative account of priorities, with relief distributed in six consecutive distributions between 
1616 and 1621. Stratford’s first distribution was made on 17 March, a week after the fire. 
Having received £125 in the preceding week, the town paid £111 to twenty-two claimants in 
the first of its major distributions. Claimants who received money at this point range from John 
Davies, a shoemaker, who claimed £3 10s to Mrs Cawdry, who claimed £442 6s.156 That these 
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twenty-two were singled out for the earliest relief gives us an idea of how badly they were 
affected. Large losses did not necessarily mean a personal tragedy – for someone like Mrs 
Cawdry to lose £442, she had to have £442 to lose; what percentage of her wealth this was we 
are unsure. From the records of early relief payments we can infer that the earliest recipients 
had the most pressing needs. The date on which money was given adds an urgency to 
individuals’ losses. We have little cause to otherwise link John Davies and Mrs Cawdry. They 
lived close to each other on Bridge Street, a main thoroughfare into Stratford and the site of 
many of the fire’s victims, Cawdry in her marital home, a former inn, and Davies in the ‘Middle 
Row’ with his wife and in-laws, fellow shoemakers, the Wheelers.157 Bridge Street was 
however a bustling mix of shops and houses, not helping to link them socio-economically.158 
What connects them is the extent of the personal effect of the damage. The same fire 
destroyed much more of Cawdry’s property than it did of Davies’, yet both were given the 
earliest relief, to sustain them. Fire affected neighbourhoods. When these neighbourhoods 
were diverse, they affected rich and poor indiscriminately. When, as at Tiverton, housing was 
more closely linked to socio-economic status, sections of society might be spared.159 This was 
not the case in Stratford, and the fire committee responded, addressing immediate needs, and 
long-term considerations later.  
Wymondham’s first distribution shows similar compassion for immediate needs, 
despite the distribution not being made until several months after the fire.160 Of 331 claims, 
273 were paid something in the first distribution. Those excluded were a few who had lost only 
minor goods (the exception being Frances Porter, ominously labelled ‘singlewoman’, who 
claimed £8 in lost goods), those who lost or sustained damage to houses only, and those who 
suffered loss or damage to multiple houses and goods. All those whose sole house was 
damaged along with some of their goods were relieved. Only one man in this situation was 
excluded from the initial distribution, the wealthy Stephen Agas.161 By relieving those whose 
sole house and goods were damaged first, the Wymondham committee also prioritised 
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immediate need as soon as it could. The deployment of these funds could not have been as 
effective as at Stratford however, where the local committee was better practiced (1641 being 
the fourth fire in thirty-seven years) and more responsive to local need, beginning distribution 
in the week after the fire, rather than the following year.  
There is no mention of poor relief in either the Stratford or Wymondham accounts, 
and little mention of extra poor relief in contemporary town records. This may well have been, 
as Wilson suggests, because the poor continued to be relieved from parish rates.162 Accounts 
of fire relief are concerned with those in extraordinary situations. Relief operations were not 
about alleviating poverty, but restoring social and economic normality; they were essentially 
conservative. Early relief payments were made to those who had fallen furthest from previous 
positions. They are an indication of how communities reconstructed themselves, not of their 
rebirth or reinvention.  
With Stratford’s accounts it is possible to continue to trace the dates of disbursements 
of funds. Graph two plots this and shows the efficiency of Stratford’s relief effort.163 All but £15 
19s 2¾d is accounted for, less than 2 per cent of the total collected. The fund ran a surplus, 
with donations coming in more frequently (on 34 days) than money was disbursed (on 14 
days). Up until 21 April money paid out appears to have been for subsistence, as afterwards 
many more distributions have conditions attached, such as ‘to build’ or to ‘be put in Mr Bailiffs 
hands’.164 The town certainly showed a more relaxed attitude towards payments made after 
21 April, with far fewer being signed or marked for by recipients. This may well have been 
because funds were paid to those who had begun reconstuction, as the building season 
commenced. Prior to 21 April, two thirds of receipts were signed for in some form, compared 
to less than a fifth after money came to be more tightly specified.165 The graph illustrates this 
break between subsistence cash payments and later designated funds. In the six weeks before 
the 21 April there were six distribution days, yet from 21 April onwards, there were only eight 
distribution days in the succeeding thirty weeks. Funds distributed track the funds received up 
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until late April, after which distributions are fewer and further between, allowing the total 
collected to rise far higher than the total distributed. During this period of capital accumulation 
the committee reassessed the town’s needs and planned the distributions required for 
rebuilding, as subsistence needs began to be met and the basic functions of devastated areas 
restored. Indeed, the largest amount distributed in a single day, £312 10s 2d on 12 June 1641, 
coincided with the height of the building season, suggesting that money was paid out to those 
who had begun rebuilding.  
 In the long term, the percentage of a claim paid to an individual was important for 
overcoming personal losses. Wymondham and Stratford were able to pay their claimants, on 
average, 17.5 and 17.2 per cent of their claims respectively.166 Payments at about one sixth of 
claims fall very short of what was required to recover losses. With resources so tight and 
overall relief relatively meagre, those who towns chose to relieve above others were 
particularly privileged. Two Stratford claimants conspicuously noted as ‘of London’ claimed a 
cumulative £1,430 yet were given just £5 between them.167 In Wymondham the privileged 
were the town’s tradesmen. The Wymondham accounts note the occupations of ten 
tradesmen: a grocer, a ‘tradesman’, a wheelwright, three butchers, two tailors, a glazier and a 
baker. As a group, they received an above average twenty-three per cent of their claims.168 
Stratford differs slightly. As an account administered by and to locals there was little need to 
note occupations, with only three mentioned in the account. Of these three recipients, two 
were original claimants, John Davies the shoemaker and Richard George the joiner. They 
received 28.6 and 37.9 per cent of their claims respectively, higher than the town average. 
Richard Mountford, mentioned as a wheelwright in his inventory, received twenty-five per 
cent of his claim.169 The Nantwich accounts include a comprehensive list of occupations, but 
these are a modern addition.170 From these we cannot tell which tradesmen were singled out, 
as at Wymondham or Stratford. Overall, tradesmen here were paid slightly more (£18 6s) than 
others (£16 8s), but personally contributed slightly more (£36 6s to £33 12s). In the light of 
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watershed Poor Law legislation, these figures are telling. Before the statutory 
institutionalisation of charity in 1598, Nantwich administrators were centrally directed to 
‘regarde alwayes ... the poorer sorte to whome the benyfyt of the collection ys cheefly 
intended.’171 Tradesmen were treated without prejudice. Yet after 1598, tradesmen at 
Wymondham and Stratford received above average relief. As payers of the poor rate and 
masters of locally apprenticed children, the trades fulfilled a dual economic and social role. 
Tradesmen were important for these market towns’ economic recovery, but most immediately 
they were crucial contributors to social welfare through the Elizabethan Poor Laws. 
 Spending on practical and symbolic civic projects was similarly targeted. Nantwich 
funded a new market house with ‘two convenient rooms above for gentlemen & townes men 
to assemble and meete in’ on business.172 Should money be left over, a godly schoolmaster 
and preacher was to be provided so Nantwich ‘may be exercised in the true knowledge and 
fear of God.’173 The Privy Council’s desire to install godly ministry and ‘Protestant discipline’ 
was so great that if appeal funds were lacking the town was to make contributions towards the 
preacher’s keep.174 In Wymondham a sizeable £1,000 was spent reimbursing the town charity 
for the loss of its market cross, schoolhouse, guildhouse and other buildings.175 This was 
however in line with other payments, at sixteen per cent of the estimated losses.176 It is 
unclear as to whether the guildhouse was repaired, but work was swiftly commenced on the 
key social and economic town buildings, the schoolhouse and the market cross, funded by 
loans from substantial townsmen in the same spirit that saw tradesmen paid above average 
relief.177 Relief authorities prioritised buildings in which ‘local pride’ might have been taken, 
buildings which were also important for the economic recovery of towns’ business interests. In 
this sense, these rebuilding efforts demonstrate the priorities of relief administrations, rather 
than the immediate needs of many in burnt towns.  
Behind cosmetic recovery and the stimulus for the ‘middling sort’ lay biting poverty in 
the worst burnt towns. In 1622 there were said to be 400 starved and impoverished in 
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Wymondham.178 Cumulative misfortune took its toll. In the three years following the Nantwich 
fire harvests declined, resulting in the 1586 dearth.179 Stratford’s fires of 1594 and 1595 came 
at a time of dearth and harvest failure and Wymondham’s 400 poor were not helped by 
another bad harvest in 1622.180 Plague struck Stratford in 1646, as well social unrest and civil 
war into the 1640s.181 Dearth and plague particularly affected poorer people, those who are 
under-represented in fire relief accounts.182 Nantwich records a payment of only £5 16s to ‘The 
poor’ in its account.183 Having no estate to re-edify, we have to assume that the poor of burnt 
towns were provided for out of personal charity or later the poor rate. Fire accounts are in this 
sense limiting. They are records of property losses and reductions in material circumstance, a 
reminder that it is people who bore these losses whose experiences are best recorded. 
 The inventories of such people reveal the long term impact of loss on the middling 
sort. Richard Mountford of Stratford died in 1661 having suffered £80 losses in the 1641 fire. 
He received £20 from the relief fund, half of which was put in Mr Rawlins’ hand, likely to 
build.184 Despite losing a substantial sum, at death Mountford’s goods were valued at £122 14s 
2d and he could leave a house to his son.185 Having lost £248, John Careles left £211 goods on 
his death in 1664, including £40 in debts ‘good and desparate’.186 Despite receiving less than 
ten per cent of his claim, Careles was clearly able to regain his standing as a substantial 
yeoman and maltster, starting a family with his new wife Ann in 1643 and lending money to 
people of varying credit.187 William Smart, tailor, fared less well. He received an average 
settlement, £28 for losses of £149, but left little in the way of goods. A partially torn inventory 
records only beds and bedding worth over one pound, his clothing worth pence.188 Smart was 
newly married at the time of the fire with a son born in 1640. The Smarts had seven children, 
six after the fire, their three daughters not making it past childhood, and first son William 
dying at nineteen. Smart himself was a widower for fifteen years before his death in 1667.189 
Smart appears to have been unable to sustain the substantial losses he suffered in fire. He had 
married relatively late, at thirty-eight, but being able to lose £149 was in a sound financial 
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position to do so. What Smart’s case illuminates is the importance of the timing of disaster in 
an individual’s life cycle; 1641 was a crucial year for Smart’s fledgling family, yet others like 
Careles or Mountford who, long married and remarried, lived in relative comfort and security 
and were able to cope with large damage claims. 
 The poor of course left no inventories. They are significant in their absence from relief 
accounts. Relief accounts are records of how towns reconstructed themselves, concerned with 
those able to have lost, and ‘the decaj of their revenues & public estates’.190 These were 
people who, like John Davies, stood to lose a great deal as property owners and heads of 
households. However, Stratford’s 1641 account of losses explicitly states there are ‘many 
others of the Towne & Country, who had their Stockes utterly consumed with ye houses’ 
whose names are not recorded.191 What these accounts could never record was the 
experiences of lodgers, tenants, poorer family members who, having little, had little to lose in 
the eyes of the Corporation. 
Assessment 
Great town fires provide an opportunity to study urban communities through their printed 
portrayals, regional networks, governance and administration. Responses to distress reveal 
organisational priorities. Top among these was returning the town to its previous state by 
providing relief, which was targeted to alleviate distress and subsequently to repair damage. 
With resources very tight, choices were made to promote the trades and rebuild community 
property. Such choices may well have enabled towns to prosper in the long term, but it was 
net prosperity, often at the price of many poor. Stratford held its position as the main market 
town for southwest Warwickshire after the fires of 1594-5, whilst 600 inhabitants (one in 
three) were in poverty.192  Whilst burnt towns kept up with the steady ‘snail’s pace’ of urban 
growth in this period, fires show that there were significant material deviations along the way, 
that, despite being short-lived, created subsistence crises for significant numbers of urban 
dwellers.193 Town records of institutionalised relief can only show communities’ corporate 
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recovery, with statistics left to relay individuals’ experiences, which are roughly, but starkly 
illustrated by low loss-to-relief ratios. Further local study is required to reveal the personal cost 
of fires, beyond monetary and property losses. 
 Histories of accidents have been criticised for being overly focussed on administration 
and not enough on experience.194 What an understanding of institutions, along with cultural 
artefacts like ephemeral literature, can provide is an awareness of the experience of 
individuals who were prioritised under the institutional culture that produced such records. 
These are the people included in the corporate ideal of the community, those discussed in 
public literature and who benefitted from public buildings. An institutional focus is less well 
suited to uncovering the experiences of those mentioned only in passing, like the 400 
impoverished of Wymondham. The nature of the historical record surrounding fires highlights 
some of the methodological difficulties of studying the propertyless in this period. They were 
only recorded when coming into contact with authorities, in these instances to receive relief; 
they are only ever mentioned as an intention in directions from government, and not in 
practice. 
 Fire was a constant threat to all, in all towns. It was realised in many, yet each 
responded differently. These responses reflect the social, political and economic circumstances 
of towns at the time of disaster and in this sense communities’ responses are useful to 
historians across the board. Fire disasters created states of emergency, where existing political 
powers – the ‘substantial’ townsmen at Stratford, the gentry at Wymondham – kept control 
and directed relief, reflecting what Tittler saw as a ‘general willingness to see the main offices 
of local government filled by a narrow slice of the population’, particularly in hard times.195 
However, the recovery of 1590s Stratford and Tiverton, unaided by satisfactory institutional 
relief, alert us to the meaningful silence in relief records. The meaning of the absence of ample 
recorded relief is ‘deferred’, apparent only when towns again prospered, alerting us to the 
barely recorded, but crucial acts of neighbourly charity which helped towns recover.196  
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Ultimately, cries of ‘flames of subversion’ were overstated. Dominant groups retained 
and reasserted control, shaping relief efforts and recovery in burnt towns, and the pre-fire 
political cultures and power structures of communities remained throughout recovery, 
perpetuating themselves through relief organisation. Fire disasters prompted processes of 
‘routinzation’ in which relief administrations were established as kinds of ‘exception routines’ 
that, in dealing with the exceptional, sought to re-establish the routines of social order.197 A 
consequence of this return to routine was a return to routine structural inequalities. Whilst 
fires caused great immediate discontinuity, after the ash had settled, the experience of 
recovery was as much a function of previous socio-economic position as it was of personal 
distress. Just how successfully, and at what cost, recovery was acheived in towns with less well 
pronounced social heirarchies remains to be seen.
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Graph 2: Collection and distribution of relief funds in Stratford 1641
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